Table of Contents Issue 6, 2024
Issue 6 December 2024
Editorial - A Need for Unity in Times of Crisis
Common security and defence policy; Competition policy; European political co-operation; Funds;
Industrial policy; International trade
The European Union’s (EU) need for a coherent industrial strategy and a new approach to competitiveness and security has been widely discussed. Recent editorials in this Review have focused on Mario Draghi’s pivotal report on the topic,1 which has generally been met with broad agreement—except, notably, on how to finance the necessary changes.
The typical fiscal divisions have quickly emerged: mere hours after the Draghi report was published, calling for increased common debt, Germany’s finance minister at the time, Christian Lindner, firmly rejected any possibility of his country agreeing to such a proposal.2 Since then, Germany’s governing coalition has collapsed, and the country is heading toward an early election.
More urgently, international developments have made the need for action even more pressing. Donald Trump’s victory in the United States (US) election on November 5 has intensified calls for the EU to reduce its defense dependency on the US. With the shift in leadership, the EU will no longer have a choice in the matter—and the change will come swiftly. Additionally, the second Trump administration’s trade policies will significantly impact the EU and its economic growth.
The central question now is whether EU Member States can find the unity needed to face these challenges, or if they will resort to a zero-sum approach, each trying to secure individual international advantages.
The European Council meeting in early November (just days after the US election) yielded little in terms of concrete action. The so-called Budapest Declaration acknowledged the growing economic and geopolitical challenges—stating that “business as usual is no longer an option”—but failed to propose meaningful solutions.3
The ongoing disagreement among Member States on how to finance investments in competitiveness and the EU’s defense capabilities remains evident. Draghi’s report proposed an additional €800 billion in annual investment, with a significant portion coming from public funds. Experts have long advocated for the creation of common safe assets, including EU defense bonds,4 to address the escalating challenges. However, no consensus on this is in sight.
Frugal Member States are deeply reluctant to take on more joint debt after NextGenerationEU. Even with potential political shifts at the national level, such as emerging discussions in Germany around revisiting the national debt brake, this reluctance is unlikely to change in the short term.
This pattern is familiar: significant, overarching change is clearly needed, but the deep divisions among Member States prevent meaningful progress. In this context, it seems likely that the EU will revert to its usual strategy of repurposing and reshuffling existing tools and resources.
The European Commission has already signaled its willingness to allow Member States to use cohesion funds for defense and security,5 a move that aligns with ongoing efforts to redefine how these funds are utilised,6 and there may still be ways to maximise the capacity of existing instruments to finance common public goods.7
These are, however, trying times. Though we have become accustomed to discussing one crisis after another in recent years, this does not diminish the urgency of the current situation. The EU faces growing geopolitical threats and an escalating climate emergency, both of which require immediate action. Time will tell how far the EU can stretch its ability to repurpose and reorganize resources before the system reaches its limits.